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Statutes of Liberty? 
SEEKING JUSTICE UNDER UNITED STATES LAW 
WHEN DIPLOMATS TRAFFIC IN PERSONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A Bangladeshi woman signed her contract for a job in 
the United States (“U.S.”) as a domestic worker for a Bahraini 
diplomat with a thumbprint because she could not read or 
write.1  Upon her arrival she became “a virtual prisoner in a 
high-rise apartment on Manhattan’s East Side,”2 her monthly 
pay sent to her husband back in Bangladesh.  Forbidden to 
leave the apartment alone, she escaped while her employers 
were away and only after a child in the building showed her 
how to operate an elevator.3  
A woman from Bolivia was paid less than a dollar an 
hour when she came to the U.S. to work for a human rights 
attorney employed by the Organization of American States 
(“O.A.S.”).4  When a friend of the family she worked for raped 
her, her employer offered her no assistance and refused to take 
her for medical attention.5  She later testified to Congress 
about her experiences, saying, “I have suffered more abuse 
than I have been able to explain.”6 
These are just a few of many similar stories taking place 
in the U.S.,7 often in cities like New York and Washington, D.C. 
  
 1 Somini Sengupta, An Immigrant’s Legal Enterprise; In Suing Employer, 
Maid Fights Diplomatic Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2000, at B1. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Abid Aslam, Plight of Domestic Workers Wins Congressional Ear, 
INTERPRESS SERVICE (Feb. 16, 2000), http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/wbimf/ 
ips021600.html.pf. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Another worker was promised $2000 monthly but paid $200 to $300 
monthly instead, which she never saw because it was sent directly to her husband in 
India.  She worked 18 hours a day and “[b]y the end of her years with the family,” her 
employer “raped her on a regular basis.”  Matt Kelley, Some Embassy Workers Enslave 
Domestic Help, Enjoy Immunity, THE NEWSTANDARD, Jun. 28, 2005, 
http://newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfm/items/1985/printmode/true. 
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that house international organizations, missions and 
embassies.8  While the conduct of exploitative employers like 
these is illegal in the U.S.,9 diplomats, United Nations (“U.N.”) 
officials, and representatives of other international 
organizations who victimize domestic workers are often 
immune from U.S. criminal or civil jurisdiction because of the 
internationally recognized doctrine of diplomatic immunity.10  
These instances shock the conscience, particularly in light of 
the purposes of the organizations that these immunized 
officials work for.11  Organizations like the U.N. and the O.A.S. 
aspire to safeguard human rights and eradicate practices 
resembling slavery.12   
Thousands of domestic workers enter the U.S. legally 
every year on special visas secured by diplomats or officials of 
international organizations who have agreed to employ them.13  
Although the U.S. government sanctions this system of 
importation of domestic servants, often employers induce 
workers to travel to the U.S. through fraud or coercion and 
then subject their servants upon arrival to working conditions 
“akin to slavery.”14  This type of trafficking is fueled by a 
  
 8 See Lora Jo Foo, The Trafficking of Asian Women, in ASIAN AMERICAN 
WOMEN: ISSUES, CONCERNS, AND RESPONSIVE HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS ADVOCACY 47, 
51 (Ford Foundation 2002); Colbert I. King, Editorial, The Slaves in Our Midst, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 23, 2006, at A21; Lena H. Sun, “Modern-Day Slavery” Prompts Rescue 
Efforts; Groups Target Abuse of Foreign Maids, Nannies, WASH. POST, May 3, 2004, at 
A1. 
 9 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589-1590 (2000). 
 10 See Foo, supra note 8. 
 11 Margaret Murphy, Modern Day Slavery: The Trafficking of Women to the 
United States, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 11, 13-14 (2000). 
 12 See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3; Inter-American Democratic Charter art. 3. 
 13 Aslam, supra note 4; Murphy, supra note 11, at 13. 
 14 Murphy, supra note 11, at 13; see Marilyn R. Walter, Trafficking in 
Humans: Now and in Herman Melville’s Benito Cereno, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
135, 136 (2005) (“Conditions approximating slavery and the slave trade exist today in 
the trafficking in human beings.”); A. Yasmine Rassam, International Law and 
Contemporary Forms of Slavery: An Economic and Social Rights-Based Approach, 23 
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 809, 824 (2005) (describing the “fundamental characteristics of 
ownership—total dominion over one’s autonomy through the use of coercion for 
purposes of economic/sexual exploitation” used to identify “modern forms of slavery”); 
Hidden in the Home: Abuse of Domestic Workers with Special Visas in the United 
States, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, June 2001, at 20 [hereinafter Hidden in the Home] (“In 
the most egregious cases, a domestic worker’s abusive employment conditions may 
combine to create a situation of servitude.”); Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreshchyshyn, 
Human Trafficking Private Right of Action: Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the 
United States, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 5 (2004) (“[h]uman trafficking is also 
called ‘modern day slavery’”); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human 
Rights, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Report of the 
Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery on its Twenty-Eighth Session, U.N. 
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dangerous combination of easily available visas for 
international domestic workers15 and immunity from criminal 
and civil liability for diplomats,16 U.N. officials,17 and 
representatives to certain other international organizations.18  
While the groundbreaking Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act of 200019 forcefully outlawed involuntary 
servitude and other crimes of human trafficking to the U.S., 
prosecutions of the new trafficking crimes are often barred by 
diplomatic immunity.20  The Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 200321 created civil remedies for victims 
of trafficking which are similarly barred in most cases where a 
  
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/31 (June 27, 2003) (“forced labour is a contemporary form of 
slavery”). 
 15 A-3 visas, under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“I.N.A.”) 
§ 101(a)(15)(A)(iii) (codified in title 8 of the U.S.C.), are issued to live-in workers for 
ambassadors, diplomats, and consuls.  G-5 visas, under I.N.A. § 101(a)(15)(G)(v), are 
issued to live-in workers for employees of international organizations or of foreign 
missions to international organizations.  See Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 4 
(explaining the types of special visas and their limitations). 
 16 “Under international law, diplomatic agents are immune from the criminal 
jurisdiction of the receiving state.  Diplomatic agents are also immune, with limited 
exception, from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the state.  The immunities of 
diplomatic agents extend to the members of their family forming part of their 
household.”  7 FAM 1116.2-2 (Nov. 30, 1995) (emphasis in original).   
 17 “Under the UN Headquarters Agreement, certain individuals are entitled to 
the same privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic envoys.”  7 FAM 1116.2-3 
(Nov. 30, 1995) (emphasis in original). 
 18 Some representatives and officials of “organizations including, but not 
limited to, the Organization of American States, the International Monetary Fund, and 
the World Bank” are also immune, but “[t]he number of such Resident Representatives 
and Officials entitled to diplomatic immunity is small.”  7 FAM 1116.2-4 (Nov. 30, 
1995) (emphasis in original). 
 19 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
386, 114 Stat. 1464 (Oct. 28, 2000). 
 20 See Nidhi Kumar, Note, Reinforcing Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendment Principles in the Twenty-First Century: How to Punish Today’s Masters 
and Compensate Their Immigrant Slaves, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 303, 306 (2005) (“the 
exemption of foreign officials from criminal suit is a severe obstacle in redressing the 
grievances of immigrant workers in the United States”); Chisun Lee, Runaway Justice: 
Botswanan Domestic Sues UN Diplomat for “Involuntary Servitude”, VILLAGE VOICE, 
July 25-31, 2001 (describing immunity obstacles to a civil suit alleging involuntary 
servitude brought by a domestic worker on a G-5 visa against the deputy permanent 
representative for Botswana’s mission to the U.N.); see also infra Part IV.B. 
 21 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (Dec. 19, 2003).  Additionally, the recently passed Trafficking 
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, H.R. 972, 109th Cong. (2005), provides 
appropriations for anti-trafficking efforts in the fiscal years of 2006 and 2007 and was 
signed by President Bush on January 10, 2006.  Press Release, Office of the Press 
Secretary, President Signs H.R. 972, Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act (Jan. 10, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/ 
20060110-3.html. 
1142 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:3 
trafficker asserts diplomatic immunity.22  Immunity too often 
shields diplomats and officials of international organizations 
residing in the U.S. who illegally traffic in domestic servants.23  
These violations are particularly egregious in light of the role 
many of these perpetrators play within organizations 
philosophically dedicated to combating human rights 
violations.   
This Note details the causes and effects of this problem 
and demands that immunized foreign officials who traffic 
domestic workers face consequences.  Part II briefly outlines 
the definition of human trafficking and then focuses on 
trafficking to the U.S. for purposes of domestic servitude, the 
type of trafficking most frequently committed by diplomats and 
employees of international organizations.  Part III covers the 
history of U.S. and international law applicable to human 
trafficking and describes the passage of federal anti-trafficking 
legislation in 2000 and 2003, as well as the impact and utility 
of the new laws.  It focuses on those provisions of the anti-
trafficking legislation that are particularly relevant to 
diplomatic trafficking, and discusses Congress’s intent.  Part 
IV explains the special visas diplomats and foreign officials 
may use to bring domestic workers to the U.S. and outlines the 
levels of immunity that they may invoke, a combination which 
facilitates this type of trafficking.  It explores the prevalence of 
trafficking for the purposes of domestic servitude by diplomats 
and other immunized officials and cites examples of cases 
dismissed on grounds of diplomatic immunity.  Part V 
evaluates several solutions geared to each aspect of this legal 
problem and argues that in grave cases where diplomats 
essentially enslave their victims, the jus cogens principle of 
international law allows U.S. jurisdiction over such traffickers 
in spite of their diplomatic immunity. 
  
 22 See infra Part IV.B.  
 23 See HumanTrafficking.com, Human Trafficking 101: Who Are the 
Traffickers?, http://www.humantrafficking.com/humantrafficking/trafficking_ht3/who_ 
traffickers.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2007) (noting that “[d]iplomatic immunity also has 
been an obstacle to bringing justice” in the cases of victims of domestic servitude 
trafficked to the U.S. by diplomats or employees of international organizations). 
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II. HUMAN TRAFFICKING TO THE U.S. FOR PURPOSES OF 
DOMESTIC SERVITUDE 
A. Defining Human Trafficking 
Trafficking in persons is “the modern day form of 
slavery.”24  In addition to transporting individuals across 
borders, traffickers commonly make fraudulent promises to 
victims and then subject them to working conditions to which 
they never agreed and never would have consented.25  While 
some trafficking cases involve kidnapping or forcible abduction, 
most trafficking victims arrive willingly but lack knowledge of 
the terms and conditions they will face.26  They may be 
promised wages that are never paid and forced to labor without 
sufficient sleep or food.27  Among an estimated 50,000 victims 
trafficked into the U.S. each year,28 about half are trafficked for 
sexual exploitation and about half for labor exploitation, which 
includes sweatshops, agriculture and domestic service.29   
The perpetrators of trafficking include transnational 
organized crime rings, smaller, family-run operations,30 and 
diplomats.31  The desire for cheap or free labor typically 
  
 24 Stephanie Richard, Note, State Legislation and Human Trafficking: 
Helpful or Harmful?, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 447, 447 (2005); see supra note 14 and 
accompanying text. 
 25 Developments in the Law—Jobs and Borders: II. The Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2184-85 (2005) [hereinafter Developments in the 
Law].  “Though the definition of trafficking varies, all definitions include the movement 
of human beings across national or international borders using coercion or deception 
for the purpose of exploiting their labor.”  Walter, supra note 14, at 136-37. 
 26 FRANCIS T. MIKO, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. RL30545, TRAFFICKING IN 
PERSONS: THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 8 (2006); see Developments in the 
Law, supra note 25, at 2184-85. 
 27 Aiko Joshi, The Face of Human Trafficking, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 31, 
47 (2002). 
 28 Bo Cooper, A New Approach to Protection and Law Enforcement Under the 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, 51 EMORY L.J. 1041, 1045 (2002).   
 29 Richard, supra note 24, at 450.  “Given the factors that motivate and create 
opportunities for traffickers to take advantage of individuals, human trafficking into 
the United States will not decrease anytime soon.”  Id.  
 30 Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 14, at 6. 
 31 “Traffickers wear many different faces: members of organized criminal 
networks, freelancers, relatives, neighbors, friends, village chiefs, community leaders, 
shop owners, employees (e.g., fraudulent employment, modeling, travel and 
matchmaking agencies), diplomats, agricultural business operatives, and more.”  
International Rescue Committee, Trafficking in the United States, 
http://www.theirc.org/index.cfm/wwwID/1886 (last visited Apr. 9, 2007) (emphasis 
added). 
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motivates all of these actors.32  The complex forces tied into 
today’s trafficking epidemic are “personal, cultural, and 
economic.”33  A larger trend known as the feminization of 
migration34 further facilitates trafficking.   
While linked to the forces which drive economic 
migration, trafficking must be distinguished from ordinary 
migration and smuggling.35  Trafficking differs from other 
movement across borders because an individual’s decision to 
migrate includes the element of a trafficker’s inducement by 
means of “deception . . . coercion, violence or threat of 
violence.”36  Statistics on trafficking tend to be underestimates 
because of the underground nature of the crime and fear of 
reporting by its victims.37  Estimates of the annual number of 
victims trafficked into the U.S. range from 14,500 to 50,000 
individuals.38  However, since 2001 the U.S. government has 
located only 611 trafficking victims.39 
  
 32 “The basic causes of trafficking are greed on one side and desperation on 
the other.”  Walter, supra note 14, at 139. 
 33 Developments in the Law, supra note 25, at 2182-83. 
 34 As Elena Tiuriukanova describes: 
The feminization of migration (the increasing percentage of women in the 
migrant population), is recognized by experts as characteristic of a new stage 
in the development of international labor migration.  In large part, this is 
related to structural changes in the world economy accompanying the 
globalization processes: relative reduction of the industrial sector in the 
postwar period and the growth of the service sector.   
Elena Tiuriukanova, Female Labor Migration Trends and Human Trafficking: Policy 
Recommendations, in HUMAN TRAFFIC AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 95, 98 (Sally 
Stoecker & Louise Shelley, eds., 2005).  “The difference in the standard of living and 
economic opportunities among different countries is the main moving force for such 
migration.”  Id. at 97.  See Rassam, supra note 14, at 825-26 (“[F]or the first time in 
history, women comprise the largest sector of migrant labor both domestically and 
internationally.”). 
 35 Joshi, supra note 27, at 32. 
 36 Id. 
 37 There is also a general “lack of precision and methodological transparency 
in providing estimates of the number of trafficked victims in North America.”  Elzbieta 
M. Gozdziak & Elizabeth A. Collett, Research on Human Trafficking in North America: 
A Review of Literature, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, DATA AND 
RESEARCH ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING: A GLOBAL SURVEY 116 (2005). 
 38 The U.S. Department of Justice posits that traffickers import between 
14,500 and 17,500 humans into the U.S. annually.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ASSESSMENT 
OF U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 4 (Sept. 2005) 
[hereinafter ASSESSMENT OF ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING].  See Free the 
Slaves, Washington, D.C., and the Human Rights Center of the University of 
California, Berkeley, Hidden Slaves: Forced Labor in the United States, 23 BERKELEY 
J. INT’L L. 47, 58 (2005) [hereinafter Hidden Slaves].  The U.S. Department of State 
puts the number at 17,500.  Miko, supra note 26, at 7.  Congress found in 2000 that 
“[a]pproximately 50,000 women and children are trafficked into the United States each 
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B. Domestic Servitude 
This Note focuses on trafficking for purposes of domestic 
servitude,40 the type of trafficking in which individuals who 
assert diplomatic immunity are most frequently implicated.41  
Trafficking for the purpose of human servitude typically results 
in a dependent, economically abusive labor relationship 
between an employer and a worker with no means of escape.42  
When an employer completely controls a worker’s life through 
tactics such as passport confiscation,43 abuse, and isolation,44 
domestic servitude becomes a modern day form of slavery.45  
“[M]odern day slavery, while not always overtly racist, often 
relies on ‘some form of categorical exploitation . . . of a 
particularly weak subgroup,’ including women, religious 
minorities, indigenous people and ethnic minorities or, as in 
the case of trafficking, persons from less developed countries.”46  
Domestic workers are particularly susceptible to trafficking 
and other forms of abuse in part because domestic jobs tend to 
be less visible, less formal, and subject to fewer legal 
  
year.”  Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
§ 102(b)(1), 114 Stat. 1464, 1466 (Oct. 28, 2000). 
 39 ASSESSMENT OF ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING, supra note 38, at 4. 
 40 “Domestic workers whose labor conditions constitute servitude or forced 
labor are frequently trafficking victims.”  Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 20. 
 41 Even after the Special Rapporteur on Migrant Workers reported to the 
UNCHR in 2004 cases of human rights abuses “involving women working for 
diplomatic staff or staff in international organizations . . . many migrant domestic 
workers employed by the United Nations’ own staff and the staff of country missions to 
the UN are still suffering exploitation and being denied their human rights.”  U.N. 
Comm’n on Human Rights, Written Statement Jointly Submitted by Global Rights and 
the ACLU, Non-governmental Organizations in Special Consultative Status, Apr. 7, 
2005, available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/written%20statement%20on%20 
migrant%20workers%20un.pdf [hereinafter Statement Submitted by Global Rights and 
the ACLU]. 
 42 Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 50. 
 43 See Sun, supra note 8. 
 44 Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and 
A Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 994 (2002). 
 45 See id. at 983 (analogizing trafficking victims to antebellum slaves because 
“[t]heir lives are subject to complete control by their ‘bosses’; their passports are taken 
upon arrival, they are physically isolated and abused and are otherwise denied the 
basic freedoms essential to their personhood.”).   
 46 Rassam, supra note 14, at 824 (quoting James G. Wilson, Why the 
International Criminal Court Should Have Jurisdiction Over Contemporary Forms of 
Slavery, in EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS 177, 180 (2001)); 
see Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of 
Slavery on its Thirtieth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/34 (July 7, 2005) 
(focusing the attention of the Working Group in its 2006 session on issues including 
trafficking in persons, forced labor, and exploitation of domestic workers). 
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protections.47  Often the arrangements for a domestic worker 
position are made through an acquaintance or by the worker’s 
parents overseas.48  Diplomats and officials of international 
organizations traffic domestic workers with relative ease 
because of their access to special visas.49  The relative lack of 
interest in trafficking for labor servitude as opposed to 
trafficking for sexual exploitation50 compounds the problem of 
eliminating the trafficking of domestic workers by keeping it 
under the global radar.   
III. HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND U.S. LAW 
A. Early U.S. Law 
In 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment outlawed slavery 
in the U.S..51  Congress criminalized peonage and involuntary 
servitude in 1948.52  These laws, passed pursuant to the 
Thirteenth Amendment, were sometimes used to prosecute 
crimes known today as trafficking offenses.53  But the U.S. 
Supreme Court subsequently narrowly interpreted the statute 
prohibiting involuntary servitude54 by holding in U.S. v. 
Kozminski that “the term ‘involuntary servitude’ necessarily 
means a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to 
work for the defendant by the use or threat of physical 
restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion 
through law or the legal process.”55  The Kozminski decision 
  
 47 “Jobs in the service industry, where most women-migrants are employed, 
have particular features that make workers more vulnerable and less socially protected 
than workers in other sectors. . . . That is especially the case with so-called ‘domestic 
services.’”  Tiuriukanova, supra note 34, at 99. 
 48 See Aslam, supra note 4. 
 49 Detailed infra in Part IV.A. 
 50 Gozdziak & Collett, supra note 37, at 117.  Lack of research interest 
corresponds to the lack of prosecutorial interest in trafficking cases that do not involve 
sexual exploitation, as discussed infra in Part III.D & E. 
 51 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 52 18 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2000) outlaws peonage.  Peonage is “the practice of 
holding someone captive to work off a debt.”  Hidden Slaves, supra note 38, at 67.  18 
U.S.C. § 1583 and 18 U.S.C. § 1584 outlaw involuntary servitude, which forces an 
individual “to work against his or her will.”  Id. at 67 & n.64.  See also Michael R. 
Candes, Comment, The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Will 
it Become the Thirteenth Amendment of the Twenty-First Century?, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 571, 576 (2001) (referring to the criminalization of peonage and involuntary 
servitude). 
 53 See Candes, supra note 52. 
 54 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2000). 
 55 U.S. v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988); see also U.S. v. Alzanki, 54 
F.3d 994, 1000-01 (1st Cir. 1995). 
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prevented use of the statute to prosecute individuals who held 
their victims in servitude through “psychological coercion or 
trickery.”56  The increasing numbers of traffickers who 
employed more subtle tactics of “psychological and economic 
coercion,”57 as opposed to physical force or threat of physical 
force, were not covered by U.S. criminal law.  Thus, Kozminski 
contributed to a growing need for legislation that might 
adequately combat the continually increasing flow of human 
trafficking to the U.S.58 
B. Applicable International Law 
From 1926 on, members of the international community 
ratified numerous instruments outlawing slavery and 
analogous practices,59 such as the League of Nations Slavery 
Convention of 1926,60 the U.N. Supplementary Convention on 
Slavery of 1956,61 and the International Labour Organization 
Forced Labour Convention No. 29.62  During the twentieth 
century the trend in exploitation of people shifted globally from 
chattel slavery63 to trafficking in persons—an evolution from 
ownership and control to movement and commerce.64  The first 
treaties to address trafficking by name were limited in scope to 
sex trafficking.65  The 1949 U.N. Convention for the 
  
 56 Hidden Slaves, supra note 38, at 67 & n.65. 
 57 Candes, supra note 52, at 578. 
 58 See id. at 586. 
 59 Hidden Slaves, supra note 38, at 68. 
 60 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 
L.N.T.S. 253. 
 61 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, 
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
 62 Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, 39 
U.N.T.S. 55. 
 63 “First generation slavery was, of course, antebellum chattel slavery in the 
United States, with its immediately recognizable and monstrous images of the 
auctioneer’s block, shackle and whip.”  Azmy, supra note 44, at 987. 
 64 As Baher Azmy notes: 
Global capitalism has organized countries into unequal participants and 
expanded broad structural, hierarchical links between poor, sending 
countries, and rich, receiving countries.  Within this international system, a 
major instrument for moving humans has been organized criminal 
enterprises of various sizes and degrees of sophistication.  The human 
trafficking industry has become, in fact, one of the world’s most lucrative and 
fastest growing criminal enterprises . . . . 
Id. at 992 (footnote omitted). 
 65 Hidden Slaves, supra note 38, at 69. 
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Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of 
the Prostitution of Others66 addressed only trafficking for the 
purposes of prostitution and was “widely criticized as 
ineffectual in combating trafficking.”67   
The focus of such early instruments reflects the 
persistent lack of attention to trafficking related to involuntary 
servitude as opposed to sex trafficking,68 despite the fact that 
“trafficking for purposes of forced prostitution comprises only a 
small fraction” of worldwide trafficking of individuals into 
conditions analogous to slavery.69  There has long been a dearth 
of recognition of the roles discrimination and lack of 
employment opportunities in many countries play in 
susceptibility to enslavement.70  This inattention to the problem 
of labor trafficking contributed to the lack of consequences for 
diplomats and U.N. officials who traffic foreigners into the U.S. 
to become domestic servants. 
Members of the international community now recognize 
that the massive growth of transnational trafficking rings can 
only be checked through global cooperation.71  In 2000, the U.N. 
adopted the International Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children,72 incorporating a broadened definition of trafficking 
cognizant of modern realities.73  The definition of trafficking in 
the Trafficking Protocol first mentions forced prostitution, but 
also specifically includes “forced labour or services, slavery or 
practices similar to slavery [and] servitude.”74  The definition 
also provides that trafficking may be effected by means “of 
  
 66 Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Persons and of the 
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, Dec. 2, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 271. 
 67 Rassam, supra note 14, at 831.  See also id. at 830-31 (noting the 
Convention’s lack of a definition of “exploitation” and criticism of its obsolescence). 
 68 Shelley Case Inglis, Expanding International and National Protections 
Against Trafficking for Forced Labor Using a Human Rights Framework, 7 BUFF. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 55, 70 (2001) (“human rights reporting on trafficking has focused on the 
sex work or sexual exploitation dimension of the practice”). 
 69 Rassam, supra note 14, at 811. 
 70 Id. at 844. 
 71 Walter, supra note 14, at 168 (“The impetus for the United Nations action 
was the enormous growth of transnational organized crime and the recognition that 
this problem could only be solved through close international cooperation.”). 
 72 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, annex II, U.N. GAOR, 55th 
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001) [hereinafter Trafficking 
Protocol]. 
 73 See Hidden Slaves, supra note 38, at 69. 
 74 Trafficking Protocol, supra note 72, art. 3(a). 
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coercion . . . of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a 
position of vulnerability . . . for the purpose of exploitation.”75  
Significantly, the Trafficking Protocol also requires states that 
ratify it to enact criminal sanctions against traffickers.76  The 
Trafficking Protocol entered into force in 2003,77 and the U.S. 
ratified it in November of 2005.78  111 countries are party to the 
Trafficking Protocol today.79  It took the U.S. several years to 
consent to this international instrument, but in 2000 Congress 
had enacted a similarly expanded federal definition of 
trafficking.80  
C. The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 
2000 
With strong support across party lines,81 Congress 
passed the U.S.’s first and only anti-trafficking legislation,82 the 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (“VTVPA”) 
of 2000.83  A “bold departure”84 from prior U.S. law,85 the 
VTVPA denounces trafficking in “unusually strong words”.86  
The new crime, “[t]rafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, 
involuntary servitude, or forced labor,” warrants a maximum 
sentence of life imprisonment.87  The VTVPA defines “severe 
form of trafficking in persons” as: 
(A) [S]ex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by 
force, fraud or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform 
  
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. art. 5; see Rassam, supra note 14, at 841. 
 77 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/pt/crime_cicp_signatures_trafficking.html. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 81 LeRoy G. Potts, Jr., Note, Global Trafficking in Human Beings: Assessing 
the Success of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent Trafficking in Persons, 35 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 227, 242 (2003). 
 82 Developments in the Law, supra note 25, at 2188. 
 83 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
386, 114 Stat. 1464 (Oct. 28, 2000). 
 84 Hidden Slaves, supra note 38, at 69.  
 85 A number of states have now also enacted or drafted anti-trafficking 
legislation.  See generally Richard, supra note 24, for a discussion of the pros and cons 
of such legislation. 
 86 “[The Act] refers to trafficking as an ‘evil’ and a ‘modern form of slavery,’ 
comparable to the institution outlawed in this country in 1865.”  Cooper, supra note 28, 
at 1045.  
 87 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (2000). 
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such an act has not attained 18 years of age; or (B) the recruitment, 
harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for 
labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the 
purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt 
bondage, or slavery.88   
The Act also created a new crime of “forced labor,” defined as 
labor or services provided or obtained: 
(1) by threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against, that 
person or another person; (2) by means of any scheme, plan or 
pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if the person did 
not perform such labor or services, that person or another person 
would suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or (3) by means of 
the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process.89 
Congress intended the forced labor provision to apply to cases 
that do not rise to the level of involuntary servitude90 and 
further clarified that “[i]nvoluntary servitude statutes are 
intended to reach cases in which persons are held in a 
condition of servitude through nonviolent coercion,”91 replacing 
the Kozminski interpretation.92  The new crime of forced labor93 
  
 88 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act §§ 103(8)(A)-(B) 
(emphasis added). 
 89 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2000).   
 90 As stated in the legislative record: 
Section 1589 is intended to address the increasingly subtle methods of 
traffickers who place their victims in modern-day slavery, such as where 
traffickers threaten harm to third persons, restrain their victims without 
physical violence or injury, or threaten dire consequences by means other 
than overt violence. Section 1589 will provide federal prosecutors with the 
tools to combat severe forms of worker exploitation that do not rise to the 
level of involuntary servitude as defined in Kozminski. Because provisions 
within section 1589 only require a showing of a threat of “serious harm,” or of 
a scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that such 
harm would occur, federal prosecutors will not have to demonstrate physical 
harm or threats of force against victims. The term “serious harm” as used in 
this Act refers to a broad array of harms, including both physical and 
nonphysical, and section 1589’s terms and provisions are intended to be 
construed with respect to the individual circumstances of victims that are 
relevant in determining whether a particular type or certain degree of harm 
or coercion is sufficient to maintain or obtain a victim’s labor or services, 
including the age and background of the victims. 
H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 101 (2000) (Conf. Rep.). 
 91 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 102(b)(13); See also 
H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 100 (“the Senate amendment provides a definition of 
involuntary servitude in section 1584 to include a condition of servitude induced by 
means of any act, scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that 
the person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint or the 
abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process”). 
 92 See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 102(b)(13). 
 93 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2000).   
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and new definition of involuntary servitude enhanced the 
framework of existing law effective only against sex trafficking 
and involuntary servitude effected by force or threat of physical 
force.94  With these major advances, Congress intended that 
more prosecutions be brought against traffickers who lure their 
victims into domestic servitude, in part because it recognized 
the growth in that variety of trafficking to the U.S.95 
Despite the tendency of law enforcement personnel and 
the general public to equate human trafficking with media 
depictions of sex trafficking,96 the VTVPA broadened the 
definition of trafficking and the scope of acts that warrant 
prosecution.  It also expanded existing federal criminal law in a 
manner cognizant of the nonphysical coercion employed 
effectively by sophisticated traffickers.97  Thus, the VTVPA 
criminalizes the most severe forms of exploitation of domestic 
workers, including the scenarios described in Part I.  
Recognizing that the VTVPA focused more on the prosecution 
of traffickers than on the protection of those trafficked, 
Congress enhanced protections for victims when it 
reauthorized the Act three years later.98 
D. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 
of 2003 
In 2003 Congress created civil remedies for trafficking 
victims as part of the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”).99  While the original VTVPA 
  
 94 See supra Parts III.A, III.B.   
 95 H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 101. 
 96 See, e.g., HUMAN TRAFFICKING (Lifetime Television 2005) (portraying sex-
trade trafficking to the U.S.). 
 97 Cooper, supra note 28, at 1049-50.  For example, Congress found that 
traffickers’ “representations to their victims that physical harm may occur to them or 
others should the victim escape or attempt to escape . . . can have the same coercive 
effects on victims as direct threats to inflict such harm.”  Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act § 102(b)(7).  See also Developments in the Law, supra note 25, 
at 2197 (“[T]he benefit of the TVPA’s definition of coercion is that it simply gives more 
explicit assurance that traffickers who use more subversive recruitment methods can 
be punished.”). 
 98 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-193, § 4, 117 Stat. 2875, 2877 (Dec. 19, 2003); 18 U.S.C. § 1595. 
 99 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act § 4(a)(4), 117 Stat. 
2878; 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (providing for victims of violations of the new crimes outlined in 
the 2000 VTVPA the ability to “bring a civil action against the perpetrator in an 
appropriate district court of the United States” and to “recover damages and 
reasonable attorneys fees”).  The TVPRA also loosened some of the requirements for 
obtaining T visas, the remedy created in the VTVPA to allow trafficking victims to stay 
in the U.S. legally if they are willing to assist in their traffickers’ prosecutions.  See 
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provided for mandatory restitution to victims in criminal cases, 
“[s]ince prosecutors are mostly focused on incarceration, 
restitution is easily forgotten to the detriment of the victim.”100  
This civil cause of action also allows for the possibility of 
recovering punitive damages and the costs of litigation,101 
exceeding what might be available through restitution.  The 
civil setting allows victims to exercise control over their cases 
in ways they cannot during criminal prosecutions, and damage 
awards may both compensate the victims and deter their 
traffickers from acting similarly in the future.102  Damage 
awards obtained through this civil cause of action could be of 
particular benefit to victims of trafficking who, even after they 
are freed from a coercive situation, often lack money, a support 
network, language skills, and educational resources.103  The 
TVPRA also allows trafficking victims to sue their traffickers in 
federal court even in the absence of an actual federal 
prosecution.104  This may be particularly helpful to victims of 
trafficking for purposes of domestic servitude, which receives 
much less attention from prosecutors.105   
E. Implementation of the New Anti-Trafficking Legislation 
Prosecution under the VTVPA has been limited106 but 
continues to expand.  From 2001 to 2003, a total of 32 total 
trafficking cases were filed, 21 of them using the VTVPA.107  
  
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act §4(a)(3); Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 107(e), 114 Stat. 1464, 1477 
(Oct. 28, 2000) . 
 100 Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 14, at 16 (“[A] restitution award depends 
largely on the aggressiveness of the prosecutor and the court to inform the criminal 
defendant that restitution may be an element of the sentence.”). 
 101 Richard, supra note 24, at 455. 
 102 Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 14, at 16.   
 103 See Hidden Slaves, supra note 38, at 85 (“A consequence of forced labor is 
that, when freed, survivors are usually left with little or no resources to rebuild their 
lives.”). 
 104 Id. at 86. 
 105 See Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 14, at 35 (suggesting that 
governmental implementation of the VTVPA has suffered from a lack of understanding 
of the law’s new definition of involuntary servitude).   
 106 “These crimes, though they are fairly widespread in the United States, are 
not prosecuted often, due in part to the lack of tools available to prosecutors.”  Candes, 
supra note 52, at 575 (citation omitted).  “Both the United Nations’ and American 
efforts represent a positive and essential step in attacking the problem of trafficking. 
Still, aggressive enforcement of the laws is not the norm internationally, and the 
impact of anti-trafficking regulation has yet to be widely felt.”  Walter, supra note 14, 
at 168. 
 107 Developments in the Law, supra note 25, at 2198.  “Because the TVPA 
cannot be used to prosecute conduct that occurred prior to October 2000, its effective 
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Since 2001, federal authorities have indicted, convicted, or 
sentenced only 113 people on trafficking charges in the U.S.108  
While the percentage of trafficking cases prosecuted pales in 
comparison to the flow of trafficking,109 there are signs that the 
number of prosecutions will continue to increase with each 
passing year.110  In 2004, federal prosecutors filed 29 total 
human trafficking cases against a total of 59 defendants.111  
But, strikingly, while prosecutors charged 32 of those 59 using 
provisions of the VTVPA, “all but one of [the] cases” targeted 
perpetrators of trafficking for sexual exploitation.112  Even as 
prosecutors attempt to hone in on trafficking, they still give 
short shrift to trafficking for purposes of labor servitude.113  
One common explanation for the overall lack of 
prosecutorial use of the VTVPA is that trafficking 
investigations take tremendous time and manpower as 
compared to other criminal investigations.114  Some predict that 
the trend towards providing state prosecutors with anti-
trafficking legislation will increase total prosecutions, 
particularly since state police are often the individuals who 
discover trafficking operations.115  Especially if the problem 
stems from a lack of resources on the federal level, expanding 
states’ abilities to prosecute should yield greater results.116  But 
  
date, some of the cases have been brought under preexisting statutes such as the Mann 
Act.”  Beatrix Siman Zakhari, Legal Cases Prosecuted under the Victims of Trafficking 
and Violence Protection Act of 2000, in HUMAN TRAFFIC AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 
125, 134 (Sally Stoecker & Louise Shelley eds., 2005) (footnote omitted). 
 108 Richard, supra note 24, at 460. 
 109 Developments in the Law, supra note 25, at 2199. 
 110 “Although few cases have yet resulted in convictions, the growth in the 
number of cases nevertheless represents a dramatic change in U.S. response to human 
trafficking.”  Sally Stoecker & Louise Shelley, Introduction, in HUMAN TRAFFIC AND 
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 1, 3 (Sally Stoecker & Louise Shelley eds., 2005). 
 111 ASSESSMENT OF ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING, supra note 38, at 3. 
 112 Id. at 15. 
 113 Some law enforcement officials explain that “[d]omestic servitude cases are 
difficult to prosecute . . . because the victims are scared to go to police and the crimes 
take place behind closed doors.”  Sun, supra note 8. 
 114 “[H]uman trafficking cases are among the most labor- and time-intensive 
criminal investigations that the United States government undertakes.”  Richard, 
supra note 24, at 469.  “Prior to the TVPA, trafficking cases did not offer sufficient 
‘payoffs’ relative to the amount of time and resources that were invested.  This concern 
was particularly apt in trafficking cases, which necessitate enormous amounts of time 
and labor . . .”  Developments in the Law, supra note 25, at 2200 (footnote omitted). 
 115 Richard, supra note 24, at 460 (“local law enforcement officers encounter 
the majority of human trafficking victims”). 
 116 Id. (“[G]iven the labor-intensive and resource-driven nature of human 
trafficking investigations, if more responsibility is spread to states for investigation 
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this leaves the problem of law enforcement focus on sex 
trafficking to the exclusion of labor servitude, which 
contributes to the lack of remedies for domestic workers 
trafficked by individuals with diplomatic immunity.  
Furthermore, when fully immunized diplomats and officials of 
the U.N. and other international organizations hold victims in 
domestic servitude, Congress’s otherwise strong laws are 
useless both to prosecutors and to trafficking victims seeking 
civil remedies.117  
IV. THE PROBLEM OF DIPLOMAT TRAFFICKERS 
A. Special Visas for Domestic Workers 
Diplomats and employees of international organizations 
traffic domestic workers into their U.S. homes with relative 
ease.  With diplomatic or international official status comes 
eligibility to apply for special visas in order to bring domestic 
workers to the U.S.118  Under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, the U.S. issues A-3 visas119 to live-in workers for 
ambassadors, diplomats, and consuls.120  G-5 visas121 are 
furnished to live-in workers for employees of international 
organizations or of foreign missions to international 
organizations.122  Sometimes these dignitaries bring workers 
with them from their own countries123 for the obvious reasons of 
culture and language.  Employers may also obtain domestic 
help through international employment agencies,124 resulting in 
  
and prosecution of trafficking cases, it is more likely that significant numbers of 
traffickers can be stopped.”). 
 117 See, e.g., Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224, 2002 WL 1964806, at *5-8 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002). 
 118 See I.N.A. § 101(a)(15)(A)(iii), (G)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A)(iii), (G)(v). 
 119 Id. § 101(a)(15)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A)(iii). 
 120 See Hidden in the Home, supra note 14 (explaining the types of special 
visas and their limitations). 
 121 I.N.A. § 101(a)(15)(G)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(G)(v). 
 122 See Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 4. 
 123 “Some trafficking victims, in the United States, are domestic workers 
brought over from their country of origin by non-U.S. employees of the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.), or foreign diplomats living in the United 
States.”  Joshi, supra note 27, at 46 (footnote omitted).  See Azmy, supra note 44, at 
993. 
 124 See Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 10 (telling the story of one 
employee of a Middle Eastern mission to the U.N. who “met an employment agent in 
Bangladesh who promised her a job in her employer’s country of origin, where she 
worked briefly as a domestic worker for her employer’s brother before agreeing to come 
to the United States to work for her employer” (footnote omitted)). 
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situations where a worker arrives in the U.S. by plane125 
without ever having met her employer, even though the 
worker’s visa bears her employer’s name.  Because the visas 
are contingent on employment for the listed employer, workers 
who do escape exploitative situations lose their legal non-
immigrant status in the U.S. and may be subject to deportation 
if discovered by immigration enforcement authorities.126  
Employers further exercise control by confiscating passports 
and other documents on arrival.127   
The State Department issues approximately 4,000 visas 
annually for domestic workers employed by diplomats, U.N., 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (“I.M.F.”) and 
O.A.S. officials.128  Through the U.N. Headquarters in New 
York alone, “[t]here are nearly 800 migrant domestic workers 
with special visas.”129  The World Bank and the I.M.F.’s 
employees together had over 1000 G-5 visa workers in the U.S. 
in 2000.130   
Human Rights Watch reports that “[t]he special visa 
programs for domestic workers are conducive to and facilitate 
the violation of the workers’ human rights.”131  Because the 
procedure for obtaining a G-5 or A-3 visa requires evidence of a 
fair contract,132 employers often draft and sign fraudulent 
  
 125 9 FAM 41.21 N6.2(d) (Sept. 27, 2001) (“The employer must pay the 
domestic’s initial travel expenses to the United States.”). 
 126 “[W]omen trafficked for domestic service may be provided legitimate visas 
to work in the destination country.  For these women, their immigrant status in a 
foreign country may specifically depend on their employer . . . .”  Inglis, supra note 68, 
at 97 (footnote omitted).  See Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 1 (“Ironically, their 
special visas exacerbate their vulnerability to abuse.”).  A G-5 visa “is only valid as long 
as the person works for the diplomatic family.”  Kelley, supra note 7.  
 127 See Inglis, supra note 68, at 97: 
Control over a woman’s immigration status, including the ability to confiscate 
her immigration documents, and threats to modify that status can serve as a 
license for the dominant party to further exploit and abuse.  Thus, trafficked 
women with legal status are still highly vulnerable to abuse, exploitation and 
fear of seeking assistance because of the temporary or dependent nature of 
their immigration status. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 128 Aslam, supra note 4. 
 129 Sengupta, supra note 1. 
 130 Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 36. 
 131 Id. at 2; see Kelley, supra note 7 (“Human rights experts are starting to 
point to the homes of diplomats as potentially dangerous workplaces for vulnerable 
foreign workers.”). 
 132 The U.S. Dep’t of State Foreign Affairs Manual provides: 
Among other issues, a consular officer must be satisfied that the wage to be 
received by the A-3, G-5 or NATO-7 applicant is a fair wage. . . . To insure 
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contracts for that purpose alone.133  Typically the worker never 
receives a copy of the contract, and cannot even read what she 
signs because she is not literate or the document is in an 
unfamiliar language.134  Employers may select the workers they 
think will be most susceptible to forced labor, and remain free 
from worry about the consequences when they know they have 
diplomatic immunity.135 
In many cases, the domestic worker is told upon arrival 
at the U.S. home that if she leaves the home she will be 
arrested, deported, or even killed.136  Workers who come from 
countries where the government and police are not to be 
trusted may not be surprised when told that they will be locked 
up if found on the street, or that they should never speak to 
  
that the applicant will receive a fair wage, applications for such visas must 
include an employment contract signed by the employer and the employee.  
The contract must include the following elements: (1) A guarantee the 
employee will be compensated at the state or federal minimum or prevailing 
wage, whichever is greater (Please note that the consular officer must be 
satisfied that any money deducted for food or lodging is no more than 
reasonable); (2) A promise by the employee not to accept any other 
employment while working for the employer; (3) A promise by the employer 
not to withhold the passport of the employee; and (4) A statement indicating 
that both parties understand that the employee cannot be required to remain 
on the premises after working hours without compensation. 
9 FAM 41.21 N6.2(a) (Sept. 27, 2001).  But see Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 2 
(noting that although the State Department requires submission of employment 
contracts for domestic workers that meet certain terms in order to issue visas, it 
neither enforces the contracts nor keeps them on file for later reference); 9 FAM 41.21 
N6.2(c) (Sept. 27, 2001) (“the Department [of State] or individual consular officers are 
not in a position to enforce behavior of employers or employees when in the United 
States”).   
 133 Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 24 (“Seven domestic workers 
explained to Human Rights Watch that their employers explicitly told them that their 
employment contracts were signed to satisfy U.S. consular offices’ requirements, were 
not binding, and were not intended to govern their employment relationships in the 
United States.”).  Through a review of forty cases, Human Rights Watch estimated that 
the actual median hourly wage was $2.14 or 42% of the minimum wage.  Id. at 17. 
 134 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  See also Press Release, ACLU, 
Diplomats Should Keep their Own Houses in Order, Advocates for Domestic Workers 
Say (Apr. 7, 2005), http://www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=17964&c=36 
(“migrant domestic workers are extremely vulnerable to exploitation for a variety of 
reasons including unfamiliarity with their domestic and international rights, cultural 
and language barriers”); Kelley, supra note 7 (“the isolated nature of domestic labor 
leads to abuses easily committed and repeated outside of the public eye.”). 
 135 “The problems [of migrant domestic workers being especially vulnerable to 
exploitation] are compounded when the employers can claim immunity from civil and 
criminal jurisdiction due to their status as diplomats.”  Press Release, ACLU, supra 
note 134.  See Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 19 (sharing the story of a former 
domestic employee of a European diplomat who told her “he was a diplomat and could 
do whatever he wanted with her because the U.S. justice system could not reach him”). 
 136 Azmy, supra note 44, at 994-95. 
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anyone outside of the house.137  The lack of monitoring by any 
U.S. agencies of the employment conditions of domestic 
workers who receive special visas makes abuses even less 
visible.138  Even in the rare cases where abuses come to light, if 
employers invoke diplomatic immunity they escape 
consequences for their actions. 
B. Diplomatic Immunity 
Diplomatic immunity is governed by the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations,139 and has long been the 
customary practice of nations including the U.S.140  U.S. law 
and international law recognize several levels of diplomatic 
immunity.141  Full immunity “from the criminal, civil, and 
administrative jurisdiction of the United States”142 extends to 
diplomatic agents,143 diplomatic-level staff of missions to 
international organizations such as the U.N. and the O.A.S.,144 
and their families.145  These individuals are immune from 
  
 137 Id. at 994-95 nn.69-70. 
 138 Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 2 (“Neither the State Department, 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), nor the Department of Labor (DOL) 
monitors employer treatment of migrant domestic workers with special visas.”).   
 139 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 
500 U.N.T.S. 95.  
 140 See, e.g., Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (Phila. Ct. of 
Oyer & Terminer 1784) (incorporating the customary international law of diplomatic 
immunity into the municipal law of Pennsylvania); see also Jacques Hartmann, The 
Gillon Affair, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 745, 748 (2005) (noting that the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations “expresses a codification of customary 
international law”).  
 141 See Veronica L. Maginnis, Note, Limiting Diplomatic Immunity: Lessons 
Learned from the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 989, 993-94 (2003) (defining diplomatic immunity). 
 142 Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 34; see Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations art. 31, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. 
 143 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 464 (1987) (“A 
diplomatic agent of a state, accredited to and accepted by another state, is 
immune . . . from arrest, detention, criminal process, and, in general, civil process in 
the receiving state.”). 
 144 Id. § 470 (“Under applicable international agreements, permanent 
representatives of member states to the principal international organizations are 
generally entitled to the same privileges and immunities in the headquarters state as 
are accorded diplomatic agents of a state accredited to another state.”). 
 145 Diplomatic and Consular Privileges and Immunities from Criminal 
Jurisdiction: Summary of Law Enforcement Aspects, http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/20047.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Diplomatic and Consular 
Privileges]. 
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arrest146 and may simply invoke immunity rather than respond 
to any allegations in a civil complaint.147   
Consular officers148 and most employees of organizations 
like the U.N. have only functional immunity, limited to acts 
taken in an official capacity.149  The U.S. may subject them to 
criminal, civil, or administrative jurisdiction for acts taken 
outside the scope of their official duties.  Members of the 
technical and administrative staff of diplomatic missions and 
their family members are fully immune from criminal 
jurisdiction, but do not enjoy diplomatic immunity from civil or 
administrative jurisdiction unless the acts in question are 
related to the performance of their job.150  A trafficking victim 
can bring a civil suit under the TVPRA against such an 
employer with limited immunity, but the likelihood of actually 
recovering a judgment is slim since the defendant’s assets may 
be in their home country, and international organizations 
including the U.N., O.A.S., I.M.F. and World Bank assert 
immunity from garnishment orders against their employees’ 
salaries.151 
In cases where a defendant asserts diplomatic or 
consular immunity, the State Department generally issues a 
certification to the court indicating the status of the defendant 
and the level of immunity to which he or she is entitled.152  The 
U.S. Department of State can request a waiver from a 
diplomat’s home country in order to subject him or her to U.S. 
jurisdiction.  Because diplomatic immunity is a right of the 
home state and not the individual, the sending country may 
waive it.153  The Foreign Affairs Manual, which is not U.S. law 
or regulation but outlines internal State Department policy,154 
  
 146 Id. 
 147 See Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 11. 
 148 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 465 (1987) (“A 
consular officer of a state, commissioned to and accepted by another state, is 
immune . . . from arrest, detention, and criminal or civil process in respect of acts or 
omissions in the exercise of the officer’s official functions.”); Diplomatic and Consular 
Privileges, supra note 145. 
 149 See Maginnis, supra note 141, at 1012-13. 
 150 Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 35; see Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations art. 37, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. 
 151 Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 35. 
 152 2 FAM 234.1-1 (Feb. 28, 1991). 
 153 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 32, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; see Hartmann, supra note 140, at 753. 
 154 See Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 23-24 (describing the authority 
of the FAM). 
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asserts that “Department of State general policy is to request a 
waiver of immunity from criminal jurisdiction in all criminal 
cases involving foreign personnel with such immunity,” with 
exceptions, where justified, for “overriding foreign relations, 
national security, or humanitarian concerns.”155  If the sending 
country refuses to waive its diplomat’s immunity and allow the 
U.S. to prosecute “serious offenses,” the diplomat is not to be 
permitted to remain in the U.S.156 
In practice, the U.S. fails to request waivers of 
diplomatic immunity to enable trafficking prosecutions.157  In 
2000, the Department of State claimed that “no case charging 
the diplomat employer of a domestic worker with criminal 
conduct ha[d] come to its attention.”158  Even if the Department 
of State follows its own policy and requests a waiver to enable 
prosecution, the sending country can refuse to grant it.159  In 
the civil context, there is not even a Department of State policy 
on requests for waivers of immunity.160 
While prosecutorial focus on domestic servitude 
trafficking is minimal to begin with,161 perceived immunity of 
potential defendants also greatly deters investigations.  In one 
New York case where a domestic worker made allegations of 
false imprisonment against her diplomat employers, a police 
spokesman noted that the employers were not arrested because 
of diplomatic immunity, but that “the Police Department made 
no determination as to whether the case, based on its merits, 
could be prosecuted.”162  The Department of State in turn 
commented that it “would have sought a waiver of 
  
 155 2 FAM 232.4 (Feb. 28, 1991). 
 156 2 FAM 233.3(a)(3) (Feb. 28, 1991); see Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, 
at 35. 
 157 See Kelley, supra note 7 (“Lawyers have repeatedly filed suits [on behalf of 
domestic workers] in the face of diplomatic immunity, only to be stonewalled by the 
United States or other governments.”). 
 158 Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 35. 
 159 See Ryan Gallagher, County Hears Perils of Modern Slavery, THE 
SENTINEL NEWSPAPERS (Maryland), Feb. 19, 2005, http://www.thesentinel.com/print/ 
303286567656083.php. 
 160 See 2 FAM 234.2 (Feb. 28, 1991); Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224, 2002 
WL 1964806, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002) (State Department submitted a statement 
of interest supporting immunity rather than requesting waiver of immunity from the 
government of Bangladesh); Knab v. Republic of Georgia, No. 97CV3118, 1998 WL 
34067108, at *3 (D.D.C. May 29, 1998) (holding that a home country’s waiver of 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction does not also constitute waiver from civil 
jurisdiction); Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 35. 
 161 See supra Part III.E. 
 162 Sengupta, supra note 1. 
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immunity . . . had the police referred the case for 
prosecution.”163  In the politically delicate arena of diplomatic 
immunity, each agency involved may shift responsibility onto 
another, until it is no longer clear at which point in the process 
a breakdown occurred.   
C. The Need for a Remedy 
1. The Prevalence of Trafficking by Diplomats 
Non-governmental organizations rally against this form 
of “modern day slavery,”164 particularly in communities like 
Washington, D.C. and New York City that host international 
organizations whose employees may import household help 
using special visas.165  Advocacy groups estimate that one-third 
of their domestic servitude cases implicate diplomats with 
immunity.166  One organization in Washington, D.C. has seen 
approximately a thousand cases of domestic worker 
exploitation by employers with immunity since its inception in 
1967.167 
The combined numbers of diplomats and 
representatives to international organizations residing in the 
U.S. create a significant demand for domestic workers.168  That 
demand is frequently satisfied by trafficking women from 
foreign countries under false promises to abide by U.S. law.169  
While these international organizations are involved in the 
visa process170 and can exercise control over their employees, 
they fail to act to prevent their employees from repeatedly 
trafficking workers into their homes and abusing them.171  For 
example, the U.N. has yet to discipline any employee for 
mistreatment of a G-5 domestic worker.172 
  
 163 Id. 
 164 See Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 14, at 5 (“[h]uman trafficking is also 
called ‘modern day slavery’”). 
 165 Sun, supra note 8. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Aslam, supra note 4 (quoting the head of the Spanish Catholic Center).  
 168 Azmy, supra note 44, at 993. 
 169 Id.  
 170 Such organizations as the U.N., O.A.S., I.M.F. and World Bank “assist 
their employees with the process of applying for domestic workers and endorse 
completed visa applications.”  Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 36. 
 171 Id. at 36-39 (describing the organization-wide requirements of the I.M.F., 
World Bank, U.N. and O.A.S. for employees who obtain special visas for domestic help). 
 172 Id. at 38. 
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The dramatic failure of justice in these particular cases 
warrants immediate remedy.  Diplomats and employees of 
organizations like the I.M.F. or the World Bank sometimes fail 
to pay servants brought from their home countries, and abuse 
them “physically, emotionally and sexually.”173  Attorneys who 
represent exploited domestic workers report a disproportionate 
number of trafficking cases in which the perpetrators are 
employed by such international organizations.174  This 
widespread pattern of worker exploitation in the diplomatic 
community will continue unchecked until the U.S. holds 
perpetrators accountable.175  Also, because victims of this type 
of trafficking arrive alone to this country and lack knowledge of 
potential remedies, these cases are severely underreported.176  
An official at the World Bank admitted to Human Rights 
Watch that “the fact that there were not many cases that came 
forward was not indicative of the number of cases.”177 
What is ironic for the women in this situation, is that many of the 
officials and diplomats that they work for are members of 
institutions, including: the United Nations, the World Bank, and 
Inter-American Development Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, and the Organization of American States.  The goal of many of 
these government agencies is to reduce human suffering and slavery 
throughout the world.178 
This irony, combined with the situs of the events in 
major U.S. cities, underscores the egregious nature of such 
violations.  The U.S. purports to be the global leader in the 
eradication of trafficking179 and thus must prevent the import of 
workers into involuntary servitude inside its own borders. 
2. Failures of Justice 
Prosecutors have not brought criminal charges against a 
diplomat under the VTVPA or its predecessor laws because of 
  
 173 See HumanTrafficking.com, Human Trafficking 101: Who Are the 
Traffickers?, http://www.humantrafficking.com/humantrafficking/trafficking_ht3/who_ 
traffickers.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2007). 
 174 Kelley, supra note 7. 
 175 King, supra note 8, at A21 (“many of today’s human traffickers and slavers 
are diplomats, flaunting U.S. and local laws, under the protective shield of the [State] 
[D]epartment’s interpretation of diplomatic immunity”). 
 176 Gallagher, supra note 159 (“reported cases are only the tip of the iceberg”). 
 177 Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 32. 
 178 Murphy, supra note 11, at 13-14. 
 179 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (June 2006), 
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2006. 
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the immunity barrier.  Government resources for anti-
trafficking prosecutions are so limited to begin with,180 they are 
unlikely to be wasted on a case where a waiver of immunity 
must be requested and may be refused.181  
Victims bring civil cases against diplomat traffickers 
without success.  In 1996, a domestic servant sued a Counsellor 
of the Jordanian Embassy in Washington, D.C. for numerous 
claims including false imprisonment and violations of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act.182  This case, like others brought before 
the TVPRA created a private right of action for trafficking 
victims in 2003, relied on a patchwork of civil rights legislation, 
contract and tort claims.  The court considered the exception to 
diplomatic immunity for “commercial activity” within the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,183 but ultimately 
held that employment of household workers is not commercial 
activity.184  In 2001, a U.S. District Court dismissed on grounds 
of diplomatic immunity the case brought by a domestic servant 
with an A-3 visa against her consular officer employer.185  
Similarly, another District Court dismissed the suit brought in 
2002 by a domestic servant against the Economic Minister to 
the Permanent Mission of Bangladesh to the U.N..186  In that 
case the State Department provided formal certifications 
indicating that the defendants had full diplomatic immunity, 
which the court accepted.187  
Victims trafficked by the staff of international 
organizations or by diplomatic staff often face heightened 
exploitation because of the fact that their employers can claim 
immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction.188  Secure in the 
knowledge that they may invoke immunity if their human 
rights abuses are uncovered, these traffickers feel they can act 
with impunity.189  Thus, in part because of immunity, “[m]any of 
the worst cases of abuse of domestic workers involve these 
  
 180 See supra Part III.E. 
 181 See supra Part IV.B. 
 182 Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 183 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 
U.N.T.S. 95. 
 184 Tabion, 73 F.3d at 537-39.  
 185 Park v. Shin, No. C-01-1800 MMC, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11580 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 8, 2001). 
 186 Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224, 2002 WL 1964806 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 
2002). 
 187 Id. 
 188 Statement Submitted by Global Rights and the ACLU, supra note 41, at 2. 
 189 Hidden Slaves, supra note 38, at 62. 
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foreign officials.”190  Ambassadors’ and dignitaries’ own 
awareness of their immunity from prosecution increases their 
propensity to commit crimes they view as insignificant and 
victimless.191  Victims report that employers “flaunt their 
diplomatic immunity.”192  Traffickers who essentially enslave 
other human beings often face nothing greater than a transfer 
by their organization from the U.S. to a post in another country 
as the sole consequence of their acts.193  Those who do remain in 
the U.S. are left free to induce a new victim to work for them 
and continue the cycle of abuse.194  Although Congress 
furnished strong anti-trafficking tools in the 2000 VTVPA and 
2003 TVPRA, these tools often lie useless where their 
application intersects with the doctrine of diplomatic 
immunity.  For that reason, the U.S. must adopt an innovative 
strategy towards human trafficking crimes committed by 
immunized individuals. 
V. CLOSING THE DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY LOOPHOLE 
A. Monitoring Employers Who Obtain Special Visas for 
Domestic Workers 
Organizations like the U.N., the O.A.S., the World Bank 
and the I.M.F. should take greater responsibility for their 
employees’ treatment of domestic workers.  Disciplinary actions 
taken by the U.N. in particular would help legitimize its role in 
fomenting the global cooperation critical to a more effective 
international anti-trafficking effort.195  The problem of 
trafficking of domestic workers by members of the diplomatic 
community is well known to organizations like the U.N.,196 but 
  
 190 Azmy, supra note 44, at 993-94. 
 191 Kelley, supra note 7.  
 192 Id. 
 193 “In some cases . . . employers have been transferred to a position in a 
different country, in order to avoid charges or penalty.”  Statement Submitted by Global 
Rights and the ACLU, supra note 41, at 3. 
 194 While the Foreign Affairs Manual of the State Department requires certain 
terms in the contract for a domestic worker before it will improve an employer’s 
request for a special visa, it does not prohibit employers who breach those terms from 
subsequently obtaining a visa for another domestic worker.  Hidden in the Home, supra 
note 14, at 25.  Similarly, extensions to these visas are granted without any review of 
the employer’s treatment of the domestic worker.  Id.   
 195 See Potts, supra note 81, at 249. 
 196 “It was noted that some of the exploiters of migrant domestic workers 
belonged to the diplomatic community.  The Working Group recommended that 
whenever cases of abuse involving diplomats were proved, diplomatic immunity should 
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thus far has not been adequately addressed.  Curiously, the 
Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery of the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights addressed the violation of 
human rights of the domestic workers of diplomats by 
recommending that “States must ensure that diplomatic status 
does not provide impunity for such human rights violations.”197   
One Washington, D.C. organization worked with the 
World Bank and the I.M.F., pressuring those organizations to 
give their officials codes of conduct to govern their treatment of 
domestic workers brought to the U.S. on special visas.198  
Despite the organization’s agreement to establishing a 
procedure for abused workers to file complaints, in practice 
“[w]orkers who have filed complaints have endured months-
long delays and hostility when they finally meet with World 
Bank officials.”199  While they may instruct their employees to 
follow U.S. laws, many organizations remain reluctant to 
intrude into the private realm of the homes of their employees.  
They may rather resolve claims that arise by means of a quiet 
settlement rather than exposing their own employees to 
embarrassment.  This type of concealment contributes to the 
notion of some officials that they act with impunity.  Formal 
monitoring and an awareness campaign by the U.N. and other 
international organizations would help defeat such notions.  
Congress, which possesses broad powers to regulate 
immigration into the U.S.,200 could act to restrict the State 
Department’s issuance of A-3 and G-5 visas.  Human Rights 
Watch suggests that Congress should require the State 
Department to evaluate the record of a diplomat or employee of 
an international organization before issuance of the visa, 
denying domestic worker visas for life to employers who 
commit egregious violations including servitude, forced labor, 
  
be lifted and sanctions applied.”  Report of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms 
of Slavery on its Thirtieth Session, supra note 46; see Report of the Working Group on 
Contemporary Forms of Slavery on its Twenty-Eighth Session, supra note 14 (noting 
the proposal by a member of the Working Group that it  “consider the exploitation of 
domestic staff by diplomats”). 
 197 Report of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery on its 
Thirtieth Session, supra note 46, at 15. 
 198 See Foo, supra note 8, at 57-58 (describing the activities of the Campaign 
for Migrant Domestic Workers, an organization whose “focus is on domestic workers 
employed by diplomats and officials of the World Bank and IMF”). 
 199 Id. at 58. 
 200 STEVEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW & POLICY 120 (4th 
ed. 2005) (“Despite continuing uncertainty about the precise source of the federal 
immigration power, it is settled law today that the power exists.”). 
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and physical or sexual abuse.201  But it is unclear how a 
diplomat’s record would ever bear evidence of these types of 
violations as long as he or she is immune from the exercise of 
U.S. jurisdiction.  With this solution, as with the abolition of 
special visa availability altogether, the possibility would 
remain that diplomats denied a special visa to import a 
domestic worker might simply exploit undocumented workers 
or workers in the U.S. on visitor visas. 
B. Educating Law Enforcement on the Limits of Immunity 
Law enforcement personnel and prosecutors need 
education and encouragement to pursue investigations and 
prosecutions of perpetrators of VTVPA crimes who lack full 
immunity.  Often police officers assume that any foreign 
representative is fully immune from civil and criminal 
jurisdiction in the U.S.,202 while in fact only diplomats, 
particularly high-level representatives of international 
organizations, and their families may invoke such absolute 
immunity.203  Police and prosecutors should be encouraged to 
undertake investigations and indictments of consular officials 
and employees of organizations who have only functional 
immunity.204  Even in the case of an individual who can invoke 
absolute immunity, issuance of an arrest warrant or 
indictment can serve a future function if the individual later 
loses his or her diplomatic status.205  Congress should require 
the State Department to provide education and an awareness 
campaign for U.S. law enforcement on the meaning of 
immunity and its differing levels.  Similarly, advocates should 
assist trafficking victims with filing civil claims under the 
TVPRA against employers who are not immune from civil 
jurisdiction.206 
  
 201 Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 41. 
 202 “The police reaction to discovering that a suspect is a foreign diplomat is 
often ‘instant paralysis.’”  Don Oberdorfer, Papua New Guinea Recalls Diplomat; 
Serious Auto Accident Cited; New U.S. Policies Highlighted, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 
1987, at B1. 
 203 See supra Part IV.B. 
 204 See supra Part IV.B. 
 205 See Oberdorfer, supra note 202. 
 206 Even if such a suit results in a judgment for the plaintiff, several potential 
bars to recovery remain.  See supra note 151 and accompanying text.  However, 
positive outcomes might include increased publicity of the trafficking problem and the 
possibility of settlements beneficial to victims.  
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The State Department should also educate police and 
prosecutors about its policy of requesting waivers of diplomatic 
immunity in criminal cases.  Encouraging investigation of 
diplomatic trafficking cases and educating law enforcement 
personnel would be the gateway to actual waiver requests.   
C. Mandating Diplomatic Immunity Waiver Requests 
After the education of law enforcement professionals, 
the Department of State must also follow suit and request 
waivers in cases where prosecutors want to proceed.207  Even if 
all investigations do not result in formal charges or convictions, 
the investigations themselves might work to counteract the 
notion of some diplomats and officials of international 
organizations that they can act with impunity while in the 
U.S..  Drawing more law enforcement attention to what is often 
a hidden problem may result in publicity and media attention, 
which could be a deterrent to traffickers as well as the impetus 
for a sending country to actually grant a waiver request. 
However, it is far more likely that the sending country 
would simply relocate the defendant to another country rather 
than consent to waive immunity.  If a sending country refuses 
to grant a waiver but keeps its diplomat in the same post, the 
host country may strip the individual of his or her special 
status, requiring the “persona non grata”208 to leave the 
country.209  The U.S. could develop a policy to declare any 
accused trafficker a persona non grata in the absence of 
approval of the waiver request by the sending country.  
However, forcing a diplomat to leave the country still fails to 
prove and punish his or her crimes, and civil suits to 
compensate victims would remain barred. 
  
 207 See Report of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery on its 
Thirtieth Session, supra note 46, at 9 (“The Working Group recommended that 
whenever cases of abuse involving diplomats were proved, diplomatic immunity should 
be lifted and sanctions should be applied.”). 
 208 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 9, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 
U.N.T.S. 95; Maginnis, supra note 141, at 1003 (“The declaration of persona non grata 
is usually reserved for behavior such as espionage, terrorism, or other subversive 
activity, but can be used in other circumstances.”). 
 209 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 9, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 
U.N.T.S. 95; Maginnis, supra note 141, at 993-94. 
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D. Prosecution of Diplomats under Jus Cogens  
In the worst trafficking cases, where diplomats 
essentially enslave their imported domestic help, the U.S. 
should deny diplomat traffickers the defense of immunity 
under the jus cogens principle of international law.  A jus 
cogens norm is “a peremptory norm of general international 
law.”210  Jus cogens norms embody the only universal policy 
rules in the international system.211  The concept of a jus cogens 
norm encompasses both a substantive idea, such as genocide or 
slavery, and a “command prohibiting any derogation from the 
substantive provision.”212  While the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations213 binds the U.S., the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties provides that treaties are invalid if they 
violate jus cogens norms.214  Diplomatic immunity is also 
mandated by customary international law,215 a source of 
international law derived from consistent practice of nation-
states coupled with a sense of legal obligation on their part.216  
Jus cogens invalidates customary rules that conflict with 
peremptory norms just as it invalidates treaties.217  Jus cogens 
norms emerge through their recognition by the international 
community as that which can never be legal.218 
The illegality of slavery is established under customary 
international law and is a peremptory jus cogens norm.219  
  
 210 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
 211 REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (4th Ed. 2002); 
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (5th Ed. 2003); see Jonathan I. Charney, 
Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 542 (1993) (explaining that today 
jus cogens norms emerge when “the international legal system determines for moral, 
practical or political reasons that a rule of law shall be established, notwithstanding 
some objections, and that exceptions from it cannot be tolerated.”). 
 212 CHRISTOS L. ROZAKIS, THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS IN THE LAW OF 
TREATIES 12 (1976). 
 213 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 
95. 
 214 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
 215 See 767 Third Ave. Assoc. v. Permanent Mission, 988 F.2d 295, 299-300 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (describing the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as a codification 
of historical, customary practices of nations). 
 216 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (1987) 
(defining customary international law as a source of international law). 
 217 SHAW, supra note 211, at 117.   
 218 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
 219 Tom Obokata, Human Trafficking, Human Rights and Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 410, 414 (2003) 
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International humanitarian law condemns slavery as a crime 
against humanity.220  Because human trafficking is the modern-
day embodiment of slavery,221 it violates jus cogens.  Thus, 
treaties providing for diplomatic immunity may be void where 
their application would shield perpetrators of slavery-like 
practices prohibited under jus cogens.222  This approach need 
not invalidate the diplomatic immunity treaties in their 
entirety; it merely suggests that where their application 
violates a jus cogens norm, they must not be applied.223  Insofar 
as treaty law shields diplomats from prosecution for trafficking 
individuals into domestic service, that treaty law violates jus 
cogens norms related to slavery and human rights.   
By recognizing the immunity of perpetrators of 
diplomatic trafficking,224 the U.S. effectively acquiesces in the 
persistence of this form of modern-day slavery.  Affirmative 
obligations to outlaw, investigate, prosecute and punish 
trafficking offenses are established in modern international 
law.225  Allowing the jus cogens prohibition of slavery to trump 
diplomatic immunity treaties is consistent with the growing 
international sentiment that states not only have the ability to 
outlaw trafficking but the affirmative obligation to do so.226   
The jus cogens argument differs from an argument 
against diplomatic immunity from criminal jurisdiction 
because trafficking is not “merely the commission of a hideous 
  
(“Prohibition of slavery is also part of customary international law and constitutes jus 
cogens.”); Rassam, supra note 14, at 809-10 (“The prohibition of slavery . . . is a 
preemptory norm of customary international law and jus cogens as well as a crime 
against humanity.”). 
 220 Rassam, supra note 14, at 834. 
 221 See Azmy, supra note 44, at 983; Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 14, at 5; 
Murphy, supra note 11, at 13; Rassam, supra note 14, at 824; Richard, supra note 24, at 
447. 
 222 See, e.g., Hartmann, supra note 140, at 754 (arguing that if the prohibition 
of torture is a jus cogens norm, “this norm would necessarily trump any other rule of 
international law, even immunity”). 
 223 “Any legal act of whatever nature and, hence, any international agreement 
is unlawful in so far as it infringes a rule of the jus cogens.”  ROZAKIS, supra note 212, 
at 17 (quoting Suy, The Concept of Jus Cogens in Public International Law 75). 
 224 See supra Parts I and II. 
 225 Obokata, supra note 219, at 418; see Report of the Working Group on 
Contemporary Forms of Slavery on its Twenty-Eighth Session, supra note 14, at 13 
(affirming that “slavery, in all its forms and practices, is a crime against humanity and 
that any acquiescence by a State in such practices . . . constitutes a grave violation of 
basic human rights”). 
 226 See Obokata, supra note 219, at 411 (discussing the dual duties of states to 
fight trafficking and to address the human rights implications of trafficking). 
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criminal offense,” but is “a direct violation of human rights.”227  
The first human right recognized worldwide was an affirmative 
right to live free from slavery.228  Under jus cogens, the U.S. 
could argue that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations should not apply to immunize a defendant in a 
trafficking case because the prohibition against slavery 
supersedes treaty law.  Thus, a court accepting this premise 
could proceed with a prosecution against a diplomat accused of 
trafficking for domestic servitude, or a civil suit brought by his 
or her victim in pursuit of damages, without regard to 
diplomatic immunity. 
The international community is growing to recognize 
that violations of human rights that conflict with jus cogens 
prohibitions might supersede claims of sovereign immunity,229 a 
concept closely linked to diplomatic immunity.230  U.S. courts 
have already struggled with jus cogens violations in the context 
of sovereign immunity under the Federal Sovereign 
Immunities Act.  In Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the lower 
court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on grounds of sovereign 
immunity where a Holocaust victim sued Germany for 
damages he suffered in Nazi concentration camps.231  However, 
the dissent argued forcefully that the motion to dismiss was 
correctly denied because Germany’s violations of jus cogens 
norms in its treatment of the plaintiff constituted a waiver of 
sovereign immunity under the Federal Sovereign Immunities 
Act.232   
One scholar argues that Denmark should have applied 
the jus cogens prohibition of torture to prosecute an admitted 
torturer sent by Israel to Denmark as its Ambassador in 
  
 227 Konstantinos D. Magliveras, Council of Europe Takes Action Against 
Human Trafficking, 21 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. No. 10, 1 (Oct. 2005). 
 228 Rassam, supra note 14, at 827. 
 229 Hartmann, supra note 140, at 754; see, e.g., Al-Adsani v. Gov’t of Kuwait, 
100 ILR 465, 471 (A.C. 1994) (suggesting that sovereign immunity may not be a 
defense to allegations of torture). 
 230 4 AM. JUR. 2D Ambassadors, Diplomats & Consular Officials § 7 (2005) 
(“Diplomatic immunity is not a privilege of the person, but of the state that the 
diplomatic agent represents.”). 
 231 Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).   
 232 Id. (Wald, J., dissenting).  “Germany waived its sovereign immunity by 
violating the jus cogens norms of international law condemning enslavement and 
genocide.”  Id. at 1179.  See also Shaw, supra note 211, at 118-19 (“it has been 
suggested that state conduct violating a rule of jus cogens may not attract a claim of 
state immunity”). 
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2001,233 resolving the conflict between Denmark’s right to 
prosecute under the Convention Against Torture234 and its 
obligations to respect diplomatic immunity under the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations.235  The U.S. should take a 
similar approach in trafficking cases, prioritizing the 
fulfillment of its international obligation to combat severe 
human rights violations over its adherence to the principle of 
diplomatic immunity. 
Prosecution of a U.N. official or diplomat who engaged 
in particularly aggravated behavior would also serve to focus 
the attention of the media, the public,236 and the diplomatic 
community on the gravity of the problem.  This in turn might 
spur law enforcement awareness237 and improve the monitoring 
practices of international organizations.238  It would also pave 
the way for the U.S. and other nations to assert jurisdiction 
over diplomats who commit other heinous crimes which 
implicate peremptory jus cogens norms, fostering adjustments 
in the global system of diplomatic immunity.239 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. “has been at the forefront of the fight against 
modern slavery and forced labor.”240  While diplomatic 
immunity remains an important principle, the U.S. should 
further its leadership role in global anti-trafficking work by 
eradicating the practices of human trafficking, forced labor and 
involuntary servitude perpetrated by immunized 
representatives on U.S. soil.241  Diplomatic immunity should not 
trump international human rights norms or constitutional 
  
 233 Hartmann, supra note 140, at 754. 
 234 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment art.7, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 235 Hartmann, supra note 140, at 750. 
 236 “[P]opular indifference also supports trafficking. Today, few Americans are 
aware of the problem or consider it relevant to their lives.”  Walter, supra note 14, at 
139. 
 237 Advocated for supra in Part V.B.  
 238 Recommended supra in Part V.A. 
 239 See supra Part V.E . 
 240 Hidden Slaves, supra note 38, at 73. 
 241 “Although on the surface the United States takes a harsh stance towards 
human rights violators, the most egregious human rights violations exist, sometimes 
undetected, within its own borders.”  Candes, supra note 52, at 575. 
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prohibitions against slavery-like practices.242  Diplomatic 
immunity is a major barrier to a significant advance enacted in 
the VTVPA, the new definition of involuntary servitude.  Most 
of the cases prosecuted under this provision would involve 
domestic workers, whose employers often invoke diplomatic 
immunity.243  The civil cause of action introduced by the TVPRA 
is critical for trafficking victims who may lack any resources 
with which to start over after escaping a situation of domestic 
servitude.244  For this reason, diplomatic immunity in the cases 
described above works a double injustice: the diplomat or 
international official escapes punishment, while the victim 
lacks compensation.  
Better monitoring of employers of domestic workers on 
special visas, education for law enforcement on the levels of 
immunity, and a commitment from the State Department to 
request waivers of immunity from sending countries in 
trafficking cases would all contribute to the resolution of this 
complex problem.  However, the strongest solution asserts 
jurisdiction over immunized individuals based on jus cogens, 
treating human trafficking like the severe human rights 
violation that it is.245  The U.S. should take this bold step and 
maintain its role as a forerunner in the fight against this 
modern incarnation of slavery. 
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